BRICS+, De-Dollarisation and the Search for Financial Sovereignty: SPIEF 2026 and the Emerging Architecture of a Multipolar Economy

As geopolitical rivalry reshapes the global economy, Russia, China and their partners are accelerating efforts to reduce dependence on Western financial infrastructure. SPIEF 2026 offered a window into the opportunities—and limitations—of this emerging geoeconomic project.

0
3212
a delegation of the Secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, led by Deputy Secretary-General Ahmad Saidmurodzoda - https://eng.sectsco.org/20260608/2356012.html

City of London – While the first part of this analysis examined SPIEF 2026 as a platform for Russia’s geopolitical vision of a multipolar order, the forum also highlighted a more specific and potentially transformative trend: the gradual development of alternative financial mechanisms designed to reduce dependence on the US dollar and Western-controlled financial infrastructure.

Although predictions of an imminent collapse of dollar dominance remain exaggerated, the cumulative impact of sanctions, geopolitical tensions and the expansion of BRICS+ cooperation is contributing to a gradual reconfiguration of the global financial landscape. SPIEF 2026 provided important insights into how this process is unfolding and what it may mean for the future of international economic governance.

Introduction

While SPIEF 2026 can be read broadly as a platform for Russia’s geopolitical projection of a multipolar order, it also highlighted a more specific and structurally significant trend: the gradual reconfiguration of the international monetary and financial system.

This process is often described in terms of “de-dollarisation”. However, such framing is frequently misleading. What is unfolding is not a linear displacement of the US dollar, but rather a fragmented reorganisation of global financial networks, driven by geopolitical competition, sanctions regimes, and the parallel rise of BRICS+ cooperation.

SPIEF 2026 offered a useful vantage point from which to assess both the ambition and the limits of this transformation.

SPIEF 2026 offered a useful vantage point from which to assess both the ambition and the limits of this transformation.


1. Beyond the Narrative of Dollar Decline

Despite growing political rhetoric around de-dollarisation, the structural dominance of the US dollar remains intact.

The dollar continues to function as:

  • the primary global reserve currency;
  • the dominant invoicing currency for commodities;
  • the main safe-haven asset in periods of crisis;
  • and the central reference point for global financial markets.

In this context, de-dollarisation should not be understood as an imminent systemic replacement, but rather as a selective and uneven diversification process.

The key shift is not the collapse of dollar centrality, but the gradual emergence of alternative settlement channels that reduce exclusive dependence on US-controlled financial infrastructure.


2. Sanctions and the Politicisation of Finance

A critical driver of this evolution has been the increasing use of financial instruments as geopolitical tools.

The freezing of Russian foreign reserves in 2022, alongside expanded sanctions regimes and restrictions on financial messaging systems, marked a turning point in global perceptions of financial security.

From the perspective of several emerging economies, these measures demonstrated that access to global finance is not purely technical, but subject to political conditionality and coercive leverage.

As a result, financial infrastructure is increasingly viewed through a security lens, rather than solely an efficiency-based logic.

This shift has accelerated efforts to build alternative mechanisms capable of reducing exposure to Western financial jurisdiction.


3. BRICS+ and the Concept of Financial Sovereignty

Within this evolving context, BRICS+ has emerged as the most visible platform for coordination among non-Western economies.

However, rather than forming a unified monetary bloc, BRICS+ functions as a flexible coalition of financial interests, bound together by a shared objective: increasing financial sovereignty.

This includes:

  • reducing reliance on the US dollar in bilateral trade;
  • expanding settlement in local currencies;
  • strengthening national payment systems;
  • and developing alternative development financing mechanisms.

Institutions such as the New Development Bank play a complementary role, but remain limited in scale compared to established Western financial institutions.

The result is not institutional substitution, but incremental parallelisation.


4. Alternative Payment Systems and Emerging Infrastructure

A central component of this diversification strategy is the development of alternative payment infrastructures.

Among the most relevant are:

  • China’s CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System);
  • Russia’s SPFS financial messaging system;
  • bilateral currency swap agreements;
  • and expanding local-currency trade arrangements.

These systems do not yet constitute a unified global alternative to SWIFT, but they contribute to a gradual fragmentation of payment ecosystems along geopolitical lines.

Importantly, these mechanisms are often interoperable at a bilateral level rather than integrated into a single multilateral architecture.


5. China as the Structural Anchor

Among BRICS+ members, China occupies a structurally unique position.

Any meaningful process of de-dollarisation is ultimately constrained by the absence of a financial system capable of matching the depth, liquidity, and institutional credibility of US capital markets.

China partially fills this gap through:

  • the internationalisation of the renminbi;
  • the scale of Belt and Road investment networks;
  • and its central role in commodity trade with emerging economies.

However, structural limitations remain, particularly regarding capital account openness and full currency convertibility.

As a result, China functions less as a direct substitute for US financial dominance, and more as a parallel anchor within a segmented global system.


6. Structural Constraints on De-Dollarisation

Despite increasing diversification, several constraints limit the pace and scope of systemic change:

  • the unparalleled depth of US Treasury markets;
  • the absence of a fully convertible BRICS reserve currency;
  • divergent strategic priorities among BRICS+ members;
  • and the lack of a unified financial governance framework.

These limitations suggest that de-dollarisation is inherently asymmetric and uneven, rather than coordinated or linear.


7. Fragmentation Rather Than Replacement

The most plausible trajectory emerging from SPIEF 2026 is not the replacement of the dollar-centric system, but its progressive fragmentation into overlapping financial spheres.

In this scenario:

  • the US dollar retains its central role in global finance;
  • alternative payment systems expand in parallel;
  • regional currency blocs gain incremental relevance;
  • and financial flows become increasingly shaped by geopolitical alignment.

Rather than a single unified alternative, the global monetary system is moving toward a multipolar and networked configuration, characterised by coexistence rather than substitution.


Conclusion

SPIEF 2026 illustrates that debates on de-dollarisation should be reframed away from binary assumptions of continuity or collapse.

What is emerging instead is a more complex and politically driven transformation: the gradual reorganisation of financial globalisation into multiple, partially interconnected systems.

In this sense, de-dollarisation is less a destination than a process of systemic fragmentation, reflecting the broader geopolitical reordering of the international economy.

Far from signalling the end of dollar dominance, SPIEF 2026 suggests the beginning of a more fragmented and contested monetary century.


Riccardo Cacelli
r.cacelli@uam-vertiports.com

 

Articolo precedenteFrom Economic Forum to Geopolitical Stage: SPIEF 2026 and the Shaping of a Multipolar Order
Prossimo articoloDal Kurdistan una lezione per la sanità territoriale italiana Se il paziente non fosse soltanto una persona?
Riccardo Cacelli, italiano ma londinese di adozione, esperto in Mobilita' Aerea Avanzata, analista di geopolitica internazionale. Contatto telefonico esclusivamente su Telegram: @Riccardo_Cacelli o Signal: RiccardoCacelli.07

Lascia un commento

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here